Orpheus; or, The music of the future — Text and Context

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In Category - Music History
Turner, W. J. (Walter James), 1884-1946 Project Gutenberg 2023
Music -- Philosophy and aesthetics Readers of public-domain and historical texts
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Words 15,581
Reading time 68 min
Text sections 9

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W. J. Turner's 1926 essay challenges conventional definitions of music, arguing it is 'the imagination of love in sound' rather than mere performance. Through a blend of philosophy and personal reflection, he explores value, progress, and the fundamental note that unites human judgment, with Beethoven as a central touchstone.
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The Music of the Future

_Author of “The Seven Days of the Sun,” etc._

E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY

Copyright, 1926 BY E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY

_All Rights Reserved_

Printed in the United States of America

I. DEFINITION OF MUSIC 1

II. IS MUSIC KNOWLEDGE OR LIFE? 14

III. THE GENERAL IDEA OF PROGRESS 27

IV. THE IDEA OF PROGRESS IN MUSIC 36

VI. EMOTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE 64

VII. BEYOND ALL SENSE 83

The dullest books on literature are the books which begin with a history of the alphabet. A good history has its uses; however, this book is not a history but a phantasy or, if you like, a philosophy. For if it be a good phantasy it will be a good philosophy since all philosophy is phantasy, or the imagination of love.

_Amor che muove il mondo e l’altre stelle_

We know, however, that philosophy degenerates from that love which moves the spheres into that love of moving in the tracks of the spheres which is called the love of knowledge, and philosophers are commonly men who spend their lives describing the old tracks in which they are running, and teaching how you also may keep your feet in them. So, too, musician has come to mean a man who performs music--he plays over again Beethoven’s sonatas and Chopin’s studies;

_partout il parcourit et parfournit_

This performance of his is a tribute to our weakness and a sign of our imperfection, and, since we are weak and imperfect, is necessary; but I cannot state too clearly and decisively at the outset that music is not the playing or the hearing of symphonies and sonatas but the imagination of love.

If music is not the imagination of love, if it is not a spiritual act, what is it? The commonsense reply will be that it is an ordered arrangement of sounds. But two words of this definition beg the question. What is meant by “ordered,” and what by “arrangement”? Order and arrangement imply meaning and significance. Can we have an order that is an end in itself, is intrinsically satisfying, or beautiful, or stimulating? But to whom? To man. But take away love from man, and what is he? What is left is meaningless, even indescribable, for in love all things exist and have their being. Music is the imagination of love _in sound_. It is what man imagines of his life, and his life is love. There are as many kinds of love as there are many kinds of life, and it is possible that they may not all be imaginable _in sound_. I say it is possible, I do not say it is probable. We do not know at present, and indeed we shall only know when the common instinct of mankind has abandoned sound as a means of expression. And that may happen. There may be no unending future of music, only a limited future. Or the world of music may be like the universe of Einstein, “finite but unbounded.” And this indeed is my belief. It is a finite, a closed world.

Can you express the life of the vegetable world in music? The imagination of a plant? The tree that rises to the sun throws its shadow upon the mind of man; you may think you cannot throw that shadow in music but you can sound forth the _shadow_ of that shadow, turn the impalpable ghost of light into a ghost of sound, transform those tremulous visual waves into auditory waves--not in the laboratory of the physicist but in the laboratory of the mind. The musician may do this. He may do in a bar of notes what the poet does in a line of verse--make a unique sensible impression upon the mind. Debussy’s _Prélude à l’Après-midi d’un Faune_ makes this impression of a vegetable world alive in quivering hot sunshine and Debussy’s music is full of the imagination of a special order of life, the life of trees, streams and lakes, the play of light upon water and on clouds, the murmur of plants drinking and feeding in the sunlight, and all that order of motion and movement which we are in the habit of calling physical, all that order of emotion which we describe as belonging to the five senses. I do not believe there is any sensation or feeling of which man is capable in the presence of the natural world which may not be expressed in music.

Music is the most concrete and physical of all the arts as it is probably the earliest and most primitive. Beasts which cannot draw or write can make expressive sounds, and the earliest men undoubtedly communicated by sound before they learned to communicate by written or painted signs. But whether at the other end of the scale there is a limit to music’s power of expression no one can say. It is only possible at this stage in the history of mankind to affirm that up till now the highest, most spiritual powers of the human mind have been able to find expression in music. There is nothing in the world’s finest literature that surpasses what we may find in the world’s best music, although, as we shall see later, music may have a virtue that is entirely its own. But it will not surprise us to find ourselves limited to the work of a very few composers when we ask for music that is as highly organized as the finest poetry.

Music in this respect has been in the past nearer to painting and to sculpture than to poetry. As with the plastic arts its swifter and stronger appeal to the senses is a source of weakness as of strength. It is a source of weakness because in every artist there is a natural tendency to slip into what comes easiest in his medium. In music it is easier to make sounds that merely gratify or stimulate the sense of hearing and the cruder emotions than to make sounds of a more complex character which will express the subtler and finer life of a more spiritual imagination. Infantile music is both easier to compose and easier to hear than mature music, so the public and the musician find themselves in a natural league in favour of the rawer kinds of music. Thus the song of obvious and commonplace sentiment and the jazz tune of blatant rhythm have universal popularity. Even an animal, one sometimes fancies might be conscious of such music. Its combinations are so simple that they may certainly be understood by every human creature. “All Nature hears thy voice,” one might almost say of the saxophone, and possibly it is the sort of music to which the mountains would skip like rams could they but hear it.

All life moves in rhythm. We know to-day that the old distinctions between spirit and matter are superficial. When I was a student at the School of Mines at the age of seventeen, learning organic and inorganic chemistry, we were taught Mendeléeff’s Law which showed that all the elements were multiples of a common denominator, the atom; and since then it has been discovered that instead of the atom being the smallest possible bit of matter, finite and irreducible, it is a solar system--its sun and planets being bits of positive and negative electricity. All that is left of the whole structure of nineteenth century materialism has crumbled away to that word “bits.” We cannot as yet imagine or think without resting somewhere on “bits.” Our minds like our feet need a solid something beneath them. It is paralysing to conceive that the floor we stand upon, the chair we sit upon, consist solely of rotating electrical forces, but when we think of “bits” welded together we feel safe again, although actually these “bits” are a pure mental fiction, and what we stand and sit upon is _motion_. If the motion stopped we should fall into the bottomless pit, the famous vacuum abhorred of Nature (alias Tophet in biblical language).

My chemistry teachers would have been as scandalized to think that at the bottom of their inorganic and organic chemistry there was nothing but motion, as my music teachers would have been scandalized to think that at the bottom of the major and minor scales there was nothing but love. They imagined that these were two entirely different worlds with an infinite chasm between them. They thought that inorganic chemistry was absolutely different from organic chemistry, although of course they would have got into a hopeless muddle had they tried to prove their belief--but then only fools and geniuses try to prove their beliefs. Neither my chemistry nor my music teachers could ever explain anything. One was simply asked to swallow whole and regurgitate whole what was obviously mere unintelligible rigmarole. Those of us who had this parrot-like faculty became in our turn Professors of Chemistry and of Music.

The great creative scientists of this age have disintegrated those old hard ideas, and it now _appears_ that the Universe is a miracle of rhythm, and that “matter,” just like man, is kept going, is maintained as a co-ordinated whole by some electrical urge or spiritual impulse--at bottom it is perhaps the same thing, although “thing” is a very inappropriate word. The conception of the “will to live” has a profounder meaning for us now, and we realize that if the “will to live” dies in a man the man himself dies. A recent anthropologist, the late Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, F.R.S., in a book on the decay of Melanesia, attributes the dying off of the population in certain islands, unaffected by disease and with an abundance of food, to life having become devoid of meaning to them after contact with an alien and unassimilable civilization. They had lost faith in their old world of ideas without having the power to enter the completely new and strange white man’s world. With the decay of their ancient beliefs they took no pleasure in their ancient religious exercises. Joy and Ritual simultaneously faded. _They lost the desire to live._ Each one of us goes on living only so long as he desires to live, and the desire varies in degree.

We have to admit that we use these words “life” and “living” still without knowledge of what they mean, but it is not necessary, nor do I think it possible, to know what they mean. Knowledge is not important, it is life that is important, and we can feel life if we cannot know it. The only way in which we can know life is by creating it, and it will be my duty in a later chapter to discuss this.

In the meantime it is clear that the line from Dante which I began by quoting:

_Amor che muove il mondo e l’altre stelle_

is no idle phantasy but a literal truth. The world about us _seems_ to be material, but exists in rhythm. It is a living world, and it is kept alive by a spiritual force which we can best describe as love, and I end this chapter with the definition with which I began it. All art is the imagination of love, and music is the imagination of love _in sound_.

IS MUSIC KNOWLEDGE OR LIFE?

What is knowledge? And what is musical knowledge? The latter question is no doubt included in the former, but we shall see. We know by experience that it is possible to learn the alphabet of a language. The alphabet as such has no longer any meaning, that is why it is possible to use it with meaning--in that form we call language. But, at the beginning, these perfectly conventionalized, perfectly meaningless symbols, A, B, C, D, etc., had each a meaning and a very definite meaning. And those series of meanings (which have now shrivelled into the scentless, savourless, unembodied twenty-six ghosts of the alphabet) precluded by their very vitality the possibility of all other meanings. Their life was death to all other life and not until they were dead could others live. This strange phenomenon is an element in the beautiful myth of Orpheus and Eurydice. Orpheus must not behold the face of Eurydice when he brings her up from the underworld where she disappeared, for in the physical vision he will be forever blinded to the spirit which is returning with him, who is not the Eurydice that was but the Eurydice that is to be. And the whole life of language is in this process of continuous dying. Words die by becoming abstract, then when they are completely dead they come to life again as members of a more complicated life, the life of the sentence. Sentences die and become idioms, idioms ideas, ideas theories, theories philosophies and religions. Every page of prose is a harvest raised from corpses and under its flowering abundance dead bodies lie thickly buried. Then a time comes when these extremely complex systems break up and the words re-emerge in single units again, but with changed countenances and expressions, to begin a new series of death-and-life existence. But the letters themselves, of which all words are comprised, are finally and forever dead--which is another way of saying they are immortal; for they do not change as words change from one generation to another. The “o” in dog does not differ from the “o” in god because “o” has no longer individuality or meaning. What we call “knowledge” is that which has become fixed and immortal, that which has ceased to live and have being and is immutable. Obviously we cannot be said to know a thing which is susceptible of change, which may differ to-morrow from what it is to-day. Therefore we can only know what is unknowable, because we only know what does not exist. This is no empty paradox. It is not a play on the word “exist.” We may say we know the letters A, B, C, D, etc., because they are the same for everybody; but they are only the same for everybody because they are nothing to anybody. If I ask you what A means to you it is impossible for you to tell me, since it means no more to you than to me. A in itself is nothing, you can neither think it nor feel it, you can only state it, and so it is, as I have said, a fact. There are in all our literature only twenty-six absolute facts. And they are facts merely because there is no life in them.

In music there are also facts, so there is a part of music which we can say we know. The modern European knows a certain number of musical sounds which are the facts of music. They can be described in various ways, but as European musical facts they are twelve semi-tones repeated in series between two arbitrarily selected points which are the highest and the lowest notes comfortably audible to the human ear. Each of these semi-tones is an arbitrarily selected note or vibration number chosen out of all the masses of vibrations which we call noises by virtue of an inner unity, a mathematical symmetry which gives it form and makes it a musical sound. But even this mathematical symmetry is a fiction, a thing made by the human mind; and these sounds, like the letters of the alphabet, have no life or meaning in themselves.

But at this point a reservation must be made. For most, possibly for all, the letters of the alphabet have a varied character, a character which derives (_a_) from their different shapes, (_b_) from their different sounds. The effect of their shape belongs to the world of graphic art, the effect of their sound belongs to the world of music. We may think of these impressions as the residuary fossils left by giantlike primitive emotions which have stalked through those other worlds. A certain artistic use can be made of them, and indeed we find that every new wave of artistic expression is preluded by a breakdown of the abstract combinations of symbols in which the symbols had become most completely devitalized, and a return to a sense of a meaning, a colour, a life in the symbol itself. This results in simplification, which ultimately gives place to a new complication. What is called progress in art consists mainly of this process. Whether there is another kind of progress underlying this process must be considered in another chapter.

Now that we have become clear as to what facts are we can perceive what knowledge is. But I must prevent the danger of a mere logomachy between reader and writer by stating at once that I am giving here definitions of “knowledge” and “life” to which we must both adhere. If any reader likes to give the name of “true knowledge” to what I call life and says that what I call knowledge is not true knowledge at all, he is welcome to do so. But I am going to use my own terms, and I shall continue to use the term “life” instead of so idiotic a term as “true knowledge.”

The knowledge of music, then, is the knowledge of the facts, and the facts are, as we saw, the alphabet of music, the twelve artificial semi-tones of the tempered scale. If a musician knows these and knows those combinations of them which are called intervals--as the combinations of letters are called words--he knows what the man knows who knows the letters of the alphabet and has a vocabulary of words. He may know them by sight, by sound, or by sight and sound. If only by sight he is in the position of a man who can read and write but not speak the words of a foreign language; if only by sound he is in the position of a man who can speak the words of a foreign language and understand them when spoken but cannot read or write them. The reader can make this analogy more precise by subdivisions which I shall not bother to make here. I will merely point out that the ordinary auditor, the music-lover who is no musician, knows the facts by sound only and may so know them with greater or less precision and depth of impression. That he should not know them by sight is immaterial to his understanding what he hears, although it prevents his communicating what he hears to anyone else. He is therefore technically equipped to hear but not to compose music.

Such knowledge may extend beyond the knowledge of the vocabulary of words or chords to those more complicated combinations which have also died and become facts--sentences, idioms, ideas; or, in music, sequences, harmonies, melodies. All this knowledge represents so much dead life which can be incorporated into a page of music as it can be incorporated into a page of prose. When sentences, idioms and ideas (or sequences, harmonies and melodies) have been used over and over again so frequently as to have become immediately recognizable they cease to have meaning; because, as I pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, having been used so often in so many different contexts they have shrivelled to that residuum or abstraction which fits the lot. Having shed all individuality they shed all expression, and what was once life becomes knowledge. For example, what was a feeling in Wagner becomes merely a major ninth in Vincent d’Indy. When the music of Debussy was first heard it was an emotional experience. Presently the intellect abstracted an element which it found commonly in that experience, and that element was the whole-tone scale. Then everybody by using the whole-tone scale could write music which superficially sounded like Debussy’s; but such music had no meaning or life, it was dead music, mere knowledge. And Debussy’s music itself tended to become a perceptive and not an emotional experience. There is a universal tendency to this intellectual formalizing, stereotyping process which I have called knowledge or death; and contrasted with it everywhere is a complementary process, the process of creation or life. But the one is necessary to the other and all experience is the one becoming the other. Just as life uses death--as when we eat meat and transform it into living tissue--so art uses knowledge. Music, therefore, is experience becoming knowledge and knowledge breaking up and becoming experience, and its especial nature lies not in the experience but in the medium. Music is the experience of life and death in _sound_.

W. J. Turner opens Orpheus; or, The music of the future with a deliberately provocative dismissal: 'The dullest books on literature are the books which begin with a history of the alphabet.' He then declares his own work not a history but 'a phantasy or, if you like, a philosophy,' immediately establishing a tone that is both erudite and playful. The book's central claim—that music is 'the imagination of love in sound'—is stated early and defended through a series of speculative arguments that resist easy categorization. Turner's voice is personal and assertive, often shifting between abstract reasoning and sudden, concrete examples, such as his preference for the interval of a seventeenth over a perfect fifth. This blend of philosophical ambition and idiosyncratic observation gives the text an unpredictable rhythm, as if the author is thinking aloud on the page.

A Philosophy That Refuses to Be a History

Turner explicitly rejects the historical method, calling it a 'love of moving in the tracks of the spheres' that degenerates from true love. Instead, he structures his argument around a series of conceptual oppositions: knowledge versus life, progress versus absolute value, sense versus spirit. Each chapter title—'Definition of Music,' 'Is Music Knowledge or Life?', 'The General Idea of Progress'—reads like a philosophical proposition rather than a chronological survey. The prose moves between aphoristic declarations ('all philosophy is phantasy') and extended analogies, such as comparing the universe of music to Einstein's 'finite but unbounded' cosmos. This structural choice mirrors Turner's insistence that music cannot be understood through accumulation of facts but only through an act of imaginative love. The reader is asked to follow a chain of reasoning that is deliberately non-linear, with digressions that often feel like the author's own intellectual enthusiasms.

The Fundamental Note and the Problem of Value

A recurring motif in the excerpts is the idea of a 'fundamental note' that each person carries within, which 'picks out all the notes struck upon us by nature and mankind and ranges them in a series.' Turner uses this metaphor to address the problem of aesthetic value: how can we rank Beethoven above Bach if all judgments are subjective? His answer is that beneath diversity lies a shared core desire, and that Beethoven's music 'comprehends' all other music without being reducible to it. The argument is supported by a striking personal confession: Turner finds the interval of a seventeenth more satisfying than a perfect fifth, and he explains this preference through the mathematical ratio of vibrations (1:5 versus 2:3). This move from abstract philosophy to a specific, even technical, musical example is characteristic of Turner's method. He does not claim that his preference is universal, but he insists that such individual judgments are 'real values though not necessarily ultimate values,' and that they can be related through a more fundamental note.

Pace and the Play of Assertion

The narrative voice in Orpheus shifts abruptly between confident assertion and speculative qualification. Turner writes, 'We do not know at present, and indeed we shall only know when the common instinct of mankind has abandoned sound as a means of expression.' This sentence exemplifies the book's rhythm: a bold claim is immediately tempered by a conditional clause, creating a sense of intellectual restlessness. Elsewhere, he uses rhetorical questions ('Can you express the life of the vegetable world in music?') to break the flow and engage the reader directly. The pace is further varied by the inclusion of Latin phrases ('Amor che muove il mondo e l’altre stelle') and French quotations ('partout il parcourit et parfournit'), which add a layer of cosmopolitan learning but also slow the reading. Turner's prose is dense with ideas, yet he often returns to a few core images—the fundamental note, the closed universe, the imagination of love—giving the argument a circular, meditative quality rather than a linear progression.

The Role of Beethoven as a Touchstone

Throughout the excerpts, Beethoven functions as a kind of anchor for Turner's claims about value and depth. He asserts that 'the profoundest, most fundamental note in music, so far, has been struck by Beethoven' and that 'there is nothing in the music of any other composer which his does not comprehend.' These statements are presented as personal convictions rather than demonstrable facts, and Turner acknowledges that they cannot be proven to logical satisfaction. Yet he insists that 'we are all strangely certain' about such rankings, pointing to a unity beneath diversity. The choice of Beethoven is not arbitrary; it allows Turner to discuss the relationship between desire and satisfaction, and to argue that new emotions and desires emerge from the 'conflict or discord of our desires.' Beethoven, for Turner, represents a point of convergence where individual and universal values meet, even if that meeting remains mysterious.

Readers approaching Orpheus should expect a work that resists summary and rewards rereading. Turner's arguments are often elliptical, and his conclusions—such as the finite future of music—are left deliberately open. Pay attention to the moments when he shifts from abstract philosophy to personal musical experience, as these passages reveal the book's underlying method: a search for a 'fundamental note' that is both personal and universal. The text is best read as a series of provocations rather than a settled doctrine, and its value lies in the questions it raises about the nature of musical value and the limits of human expression.

Reading Turner’s claim that music is “the imagination of love in sound” brought me back to evenings at my grandmother’s piano, where she’d play Beethoven reluctantly, as if confessing something. I remembered, too, the quiet thrill of first grasping that same idea in How to Listen to Music, 7th ed. Hints and Suggestions to Untaught Lovers of the Art — Context and Discussion—not instruction, but permission to hear more softly.

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